The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.
Introduction
Iterated (maximal) elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) has a long history and some intuitive appeal, yet it does not have as clear an interpretation as iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies (IESDS). IESDS is known to be equivalent to common belief of rational choice (cf. Tan and Werlang, 1988) . IEWDS would appear simply to add a requirement of admissibility, i.e., that one strategy should be preferred to another if the former weakly dominates the latter on a set of strategies that the opponent "may choose." However, numerous authors-in particular, Samuelson (1992) -have noted that it is not clear that we can interpret IEWDS this way. To see this, consider the following two examples. Figure 1 shows the pure strategy reduced strategic form of the 'Battle-of-the-sexes-withan-outside-option' game. Here IEWDS works by eliminating D, R, and U , leading to the forward induction outcome (M, L) . This prediction appears consistent: if 2 believes that 1 will choose M, then she will prefer L to R as 2's preference over her strategies depends only on the relative likelihood of M and D.
The situation is different in G 2 of Fig. 2 , where IEWDS works by eliminating D, R, and M, leading to (U, L). Since 2 is indifferent at the predicted outcome, we must here appeal to admissibility on a superset of {U }, namely {U, M}, to justify the statement that 2 must play L. However, it is not clear that this is reasonable. Admissibility on {U, M} means that 2's preferences respect weak dominance on this set and implies that M is deemed infinitely more likely (in the sense of Blume et al., 1991a , Definition 5.1; see also Appendix A) than D. However, why should 2 deem M more likely than D? If 2 believes that 1 believes in the prediction that 2 plays L (as IEWDS suggests), then it seems odd to assume that 2 believes that 1 considers D to be a less attractive choice than M.
A sense in which D is "less rational" than M is simply that it was eliminated first. This hardly seems a justification for insisting on the belief that D is much less likely than M. Still, Stahl (1995) has shown that IEWDS effectively assumes this: a strategy survives IEWDS if and only it is a best response to a belief where one strategy is infinitely less likely than another if the former is eliminated at an earlier round than the latter. Thus, IEWDS adds extraneous and hard-to-justify restrictions on beliefs, and may not appear to correspond to the most natural formalization of deductive reasoning under admissibility.
So what does?
This paper proposes the concept of 'fully permissible sets' as an answer. In G 1 this concept agrees with the prediction of IEWDS, as seems natural. The procedure leading to this prediction is quite different, though, as is its interpretation. In G 2 , however, full permissibility predicts that 1's set of rational choices is either {U } or {U, M}, while 2's set of rational choices is either {L} or {L, R}. This has appealing features. If 2 is certain that 1's set is {U }, then-absent extraneous restrictions on beliefs-one cannot conclude that 2 prefers L to R or v.v. On the other hand, if 2 considers it possible that 1's set is {U, M}, then L weakly dominates R on this set and justifies {L} as 2's set of rational choices. Similarly, one can justify that U is preferred to M if and only if 1 considers it impossible that 2's set is {L, R}. Thus, full permissibility tells a consistent story of deductive reasoning under admissibility, without adding extraneous restrictions on beliefs.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the key features of the requirement-called 'full admissible consistency'-that is imposed on players to arrive at full permissibility. Section 3 formally defines the concept of fully permissible sets through an algorithm that eliminates strategy sets under full admissible consistency. General existence as well as other properties are shown. Section 4 establishes epistemic conditions for the concept of fully permissible sets, while Section 5 checks that these conditions are indeed necessary and thereby relates full permissibility to other concepts. Section 6 investigates examples, showing how forward induction is promoted and how multiple permissible sets may arise. Section 7 compares our epistemic conditions to those provided in related literature. Some technical material (including the proofs) are contained in three appendices. For ease of presentation, the analysis will be limited to 2-player games, but everything can essentially be generalized to n-player games (with n > 2).
Illustrating the key features

Our modeling captures three key features:
Caution. A player should prefer one strategy to another if the former weakly dominates the latter. Such admissibility of a player's preferences on the set of all opponent strategies is defended by, e.g., Luce and Raiffa (1957, Chapter 13) and is implicit in procedures that start out by eliminating all weakly dominated strategies.
Full belief of opponent rationality.
A player should deem any opponent strategy that is a rational choice infinitely more likely than any opponent strategy not having this property. This is equivalent to preferring one strategy to another if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of rational choices for the opponent. Such admissibility of a player's preferences on a particular subset of opponent strategies is an ingredient of the analyses of weak dominance by Samuelson (1992) and Börgers and Samuelson (1992) , and is essentially satisfied by 'extensive form rationalizability' (EFR; cf. Pearce, 1984 and Battigalli, 1996 and IEWDS.
No extraneous restrictions on beliefs.
A player should prefer one strategy to another only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the set of rational choices for the opponent. Such equal treatment of opponent strategies that are all rational-or all irrational-have in principle been argued by Samuelson (1992, p. 311) , Gul (1997), and Mariotti (1997) .
These features are combined as follows. A player's preferences over his own strategies, which depend both on his payoff function and on his beliefs about opponent choice, leads to a choice set (i.e., a set of maximal strategies; cf. Section 4.3). A player's preferences are said to be fully admissibly consistent with the opponent's preferences if one strategy is preferred to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter
• on the set of all opponent strategies, or • on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. A subset of strategies is a fully permissible set if and only if it can be a choice set when there is common certain belief of full admissible consistency, where an event is 'certainly believed' if the complement is deemed impossible (i.e., Savage-null; cf. Section 4.5). Hence, the analysis yields a solution concept that determines a collection of choice sets for each player. This collection can be found via a simple algorithm, introduced in the next section. We use G 3 of Fig. 3 to illustrate the consequences of imposing 'caution' and 'full belief of opponent rationality.' Since 'caution' means that each player takes all opponent strategies into account, it follows that player 1's preferences over his strategies will be U ∼ M D (where ∼ and denote indifference and preference, respectively). Player 1 must prefer each of the strategies U and M to the strategy D, because the former strategies weakly dominate D. Hence, U and M are maximal, implying that 1's choice set is {U, M}.
The requirement of 'full belief in opponent rationality' comes into effect when considering the preferences of player 2. Suppose that 2 certainly believes that 1 is cautious and therefore (as indicated above) certainly believes that {U, M} is 1's choice set. Our assumption that 2 has full belief of 1's rationality captures that 2 deems each element of {U, M} infinitely more likely than D. Thus, 2's preferences respect weak dominance on 1's choice set {U, M}, regardless of what happens if 1 chooses D. Hence, 2's preferences over her strategies will be L R.
Summing up, we get to the following solution for G 3 :
Hence, {U, M} and {L} are the players' fully permissible sets. The third feature of full admissible consistency-'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'-means in G 3 that 2 does not assess the relative likelihood of 1's maximal strategies U and M. This does not have any bearing on the analysis of G 3 , but is essential for capturing forward induction in G 1 . In this case the issue is not whether a player assesses the relative likelihood of different maximal strategies, but rather whether a player assesses the relative likelihood of different non-maximal strategies. To see the significance in G 1 , assume that 1 deems R infinitely more likely than L, while 2 deems U infinitely more likely than D and D infinitely more likely than M. Then the players rank their strategies as follows:
Both 'caution' and 'full belief of opponent rationality' are satisfied and still the forward induction outcome (M, L) is not promoted. However, the requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' is not satisfied since the preferences of 2 introduce extraneous restrictions on beliefs by deeming one of 1's non-maximal strategies, D, infinitely more likely than another non-maximal strategy, M. When we return to G 1 in Sections 3.3 and 6.1 we show how the additional imposition of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' leads to (M, L) in this game.
Several concepts with natural epistemic foundations fail to match these predictions in G 1 and G 3 . In the case of rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) this is perhaps not so surprising since this concept in 2-player games corresponds to IESDS. It can be understood as a consequence of common belief of rational choice without imposing caution, so there is no guarantee that a player prefers one strategy to another if the former weakly dominates the latter. In G 3 , for example, all strategies are rationalizable.
It is more surprising that the concept of 'permissibility' does not match our solution of G 3 . Permissibility can be given rigorous epistemic foundations in models with cautious players (cf. Börgers, 1994, and Brandenburger, 1992 , who coined the term 'permissible'; see also Ben-Porath, 1997, and Gul, 1997) . In these models players take into account all opponent strategies, while assigning more weight to a subset of those deemed to be rational choices. Permissibility corresponds to the DF procedure (after Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990) where one round of elimination of (all) weakly dominated strategies is followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. In G 3 , this means that 1 cannot choose his weakly dominated strategy D. However, while 2 prefers L to R in our solution, permissibility allows that 2 chooses R. To exemplify using Brandenburger's (1992) approach, this will be the case if 2 deems U to be infinitely more likely than D which in turn is deemed infinitely more likely than M. The problem is that 'full belief of opponent rationality' is not satisfied: Player 2 deems D more likely than M even though M is in 1's choice set, while D is not. In Section 3.4 we establish (Proposition 3.2) that the concept of fully permissible sets refines the DF procedure.
The algorithm
We present in this section an algorithm-'iterated elimination of choice sets under full admissible consistency' (IECFA)-leading to the concept of 'fully permissible sets.' This concept will in turn be given an epistemic characterization in Section 4 by imposing common certain belief of full admissible consistency. We present the algorithm before the epistemic characterization for different reasons:
• IECFA is fairly accessible. By defining it early, we can apply it early, and offer early indications of the nature of the solution concept we wish to promote.
• By defining IECFA, we point to a parallel to the concepts of rationalizable strategies and permissible strategies. These concepts are motivated by epistemic assumptions, but turn out to be identical in 2-player games to the set of strategies surviving simple algorithms: respectively, IESDS and the DF procedure.
• Just like IESDS and the DF procedure, IECFA is easier to use than the corresponding epistemic characterizations. The algorithm should be handy for applied economists, independently of the foundational issues discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
IESDS and the DF procedure iteratively eliminate dominated strategies. In the corresponding epistemic models, these strategies in turn cannot be rational choices, cannot be rational choices given that other players do not use strategies that cannot be rational choices, etc. IECFA is also an elimination procedure. However, the interpretation of the basic item thrown out is not that of a strategy that cannot be a rational choice, but rather that of a set of strategies that cannot be a choice set for any preferences that are in a given sense consistent with the preferences of the opponent. The specific kind of consistency involved in IECFA-which will be defined in Section 4.6 and referred to as 'full admissible consistency'-requires that a player's preferences are characterized by the properties of 'caution,' 'full belief of opponent rationality' and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs.' Thus, IECFA does not start with each player's strategy set and then iteratively eliminates strategies. Rather, IECFA starts with each player's collection of non-empty subsets of his strategy set and then iteratively eliminates subsets from this collection.
A strategic game
With I = {1, 2} as the set of players, let, for each i, S i denote player i's finite set of pure strategies and u i : S → be a vNM utility function that assigns payoff to any strategy vector, where S = S 1 × S 2 is the set of strategy vectors. Then G = (S 1 , S 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) is a finite strategic two-player game. Write p i , r i , and s i (∈ S i ) for pure strategies and x i and y i (∈ ∆(S i )) for mixed strategies. We may extend u i to mixed strategies:
Definition
Let S j (⊆ S j ) be a set of opponent strategies. Say that x i weakly dominates y i on S j if, ∀s j ∈ S j , u i (x i , s j ) u i (y i , s j ), with strict inequality for some s j ∈ S j . Interpret Q j (⊆ S j ) as the set of strategies that player i deems to be the set of rational choices for his opponent. Let i's choice set be equal to S i \D i (Q j ), where, for any
Hence, i's choice set consists of pure strategies that are not weakly dominated by any mixed strategy on Q j or S j . In Section 4 we show how this corresponds to a set of maximal strategies given the player's preferences over his own strategies.
Let Σ = Σ 1 × Σ 2 , where Σ i := 2 S i \{∅} denotes the collection of non-empty subsets of S i . Write π i , ρ i , and σ i (∈ Σ i ) for subsets of pure strategies. For any
Hence, α i (Ξ j ) is the collection of strategy subsets that can be choice sets for player i if he associates Q j -the set of rational choices for his opponent-with the union of the strategy subsets in a non-empty subcollection of Ξ j .
We can now define the concept of a fully permissible set.
Definition 3.1. Consider the sequence defined by Ξ(0) = Σ and, ∀g 1,
). A non-empty strategy set π i is said to be a fully permissible set for player i
Let Π = Π 1 × Π 2 denote the collection of vectors of fully permissible sets. Since
and since the game is finite, Ξ(g) is a monotone sequence that converges to Π in a finite number of iterations. IECFA is the procedure that in round g eliminates sets in Ξ(g −1)\Ξ(g) as possible choice sets. As defined in Definition 3.1 IECFA eliminates maximally in each round in the sense that, ∀g 1, Ξ(g) = α(Ξ (g − 1)). However, it follows from the monotonicity of α i that any non-maximal procedure, where ∃g 1 such that
A strategy subset survives elimination round g if it can be a choice set when the set of rational choices for his opponent is associated with the union of some (or all) of opponent sets that have survived the procedure up till round g − 1. A fully permissible set is a set that survives in this way for any g. The analysis of Section 4 justifies that strategy subsets that this algorithm has not eliminated by round g be interpreted as choice sets compatible with g − 1 order of mutual certain belief of full admissible consistency.
Applications
We illustrate IECFA by applying it. Consider G 3 of Section 2. We get:
Independently of Q 2 , S 1 \D 1 (Q 2 ) = {U, M}, so for 1 only {U, M} can survive the first elimination round, while S 2 \D 2 ({U, M}) = {L}, S 2 \D 2 ({D}) = {R} and S 2 \D 2 ({U }) = {L, R}, so that no elimination is possible for player 2. However, in the second round only {L} survives since L weakly dominates R on {U, M}, implying that S 2 \D 2 ({U, M}) = {L}.
Next, consider G 1 of the introduction. Applying IECFA we get:
Again the algorithm yields a unique fully permissible set for each player. Finally, apply IECFA to G 2 of the introduction:
Here we are left with two fully permissible sets for each player. There is no further elimination, as
The elimination process for G 1 and G 2 is explained and interpreted in Section 6.
Results
The following proposition characterizes the strategy subsets that survive IECFA and thus are fully permissible.
Proposition 3.1(i) establishes existence, but not uniqueness, of each player's fully permissible set(s). In addition to G 2 , games with multiple strict Nash equilibria illustrate the possibility of such multiplicity; by Proposition 3.1(iii), any strict Nash equilibrium corresponds to a vector of fully permissible sets. Proposition 3.1(ii) means that Π is a fixed point in terms of a collection of vectors of strategy sets as illustrated by G 2 above. By Proposition 3.1(iii) it is the largest such fixed point.
We close this section by recording some connections between IECFA on the one hand, and IESDS, the DF-procedure, and IEWDS on the other. First, we note through the following Proposition 3.2 that IECFA has more bite than the DF procedure. Both G 1 and G 3 illustrate that this refinement may be strict.
Proposition 3.2. A pure strategy p i is permissible (i.e., survives the DF procedure) if there exists a fully permissible set
It is a corollary that IECFA has more cutting power also than IESDS. However, neither of IECFA and IEWDS has more bite than the other, as demonstrated by the game G 4 of Fig. 4 . It is straightforward to verify that a and b for player 1, and e for player 2 survive IEWDS, while {a} for 1 and {e, f } for 2 survive IECFA and are thus the fully permissible sets, as shown below: 
Strategy b survives IEWDS but does not appear in any fully permissible set. Strategy f appears in a fully permissible set but does not survive IEWDS.
Epistemic conditions for fully permissible sets
When justifying rationalizable and permissible strategies through epistemic conditions, players are usually modeled as decision makers under uncertainty. Tan and Werlang (1988) characterize rationalizable strategies by common belief (with probability 1) of the event that each player chooses a maximal strategy given preferences that are represented by a subjective probability distribution. Hence, preferences are both complete and continuous. Brandenburger (1992) characterizes permissible strategies by common belief (with primary probability 1) of the event that each player chooses a maximal strategy given preferences that are represented by a lexicographic probability system (LPS; cf. Blume et al., 1991a) with full support on the set of opponent strategies. Hence, preferences are still complete, but not continuous due to the full support requirement. Since preferences are complete and representable by a probability distribution or an LPS, these epistemic justifications differ significantly from the corresponding algorithms, IESDS and the DF procedure, neither of which makes reference to subjective probabilities.
When doing analogously for fully permissible sets, not only must continuity of preferences be relaxed to allow for 'caution' and 'full belief of opponent rationality,' as discussed in Section 2. One must also relax completeness of preferences to accommodate 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs,' which is a requirement of minimal completeness and implies that preferences are expressed solely in terms of admissibility on nested sets. Hence, preferences are not in general representable by subjective probabilities (except through treating incomplete preferences as a set of complete preferences; cf. Aumann, 1962) . This means that epistemic operators must be derived directly from the underlying preferences (as observed by Morris, 1997) since there is no probability distribution or LPS that represents the preferences. It also entails that the resulting characterization (Proposition 4.1) must be closely related to the algorithm used in the definition of fully permissible sets.
There is another fundamental difference. When characterizing rationalizable and permissible strategies, the event that is made subject to interactive epistemology is often defined by requiring that each player's strategy choice is an element of his choice set (i.e., his set of maximal strategies) given his belief about the opponent's strategy choice. In contrast, in the characterization of Proposition 4.1, the event that is made subject to interactive epistemology is defined by imposing requirements on how each player's choice set is related to his belief about the opponent's choice set. Since a player's choice set equals the set of undominated strategies given the ranking that the player has over his strategies, the imposed requirements relate a player's ranking over his strategies to the opponent's ranking.
To prepare for the characterization result we first present a framework for strategic games where each player is modeled as a decision-maker under uncertainty and introduce the belief operator that is used for the interactive epistemology. We then move to the characterization of Proposition 4.1, which is interpreted in the subsequent Section 5 in terms of the requirements of 'caution,' 'full belief of opponent rationality,' and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs.'
A strategic game form
Let z : S → Z map strategy vectors into outcomes, where Z is the set of outcomes. Then (S 1 , S 2 , z) is a finite strategic two-player game form.
States and types
The uncertainty faced by a player i in a strategic game form concerns the strategy choice of his opponent j , j 's belief about i's strategy choice, and so on (cf. Tan and Werlang, 1988) . A type of a player i corresponds to a vNM utility function and a belief about j 's strategy choice, a belief about j 's belief about i's strategy choice, and so on. Models of such infinite hierarchies of beliefs (Böge and Eisele, 1979; Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993; Epstein and Wang, 1996) yield S × T as the complete state space, where T = T 1 × T 2 is the set of all feasible type vectors. Furthermore, for each i, there is a homeomorphism between T i and the set of beliefs on S × T j . For each type of any player i, the type's decision problem is to choose one of i's strategies. For the modeling of this problem, the type's belief about i's strategy choice is not relevant and can be ignored. 1 Hence, in the setting of a strategic game form the beliefs can be restricted to the set of opponent strategy-type pairs, S j × T j . Combined with a vNM utility function, the set of beliefs on S j × T j corresponds to a set of binary relations on the set of acts on S j × T j , where an act on S j × T j is a function that to any element of S j × T j assigns an objective randomization on Z (cf. Appendix A).
In conformity with the literature on infinite hierarchies of beliefs, let
• the set of states of the world (or simply states) be Ω := S × T , • each type t i of any player i correspond to a binary relation t i on the set of acts on S j × T j .
However, as the above results on infinite hierarchies of beliefs are not applicable in the present setting, 2 we instead consider an implicit model-with a finite type set T i for each player i-from which infinite hierarchies of beliefs can be constructed. Moreover, since completeness and continuity of preferences are not imposed, the conditions on t i are specified as follows. 
Choice sets and rationality
Let t i S j denote the marginal of t i on S j (cf. Appendix A). A pure strategy s i ∈ S i can be viewed as an act x S j on S j that assigns z(s i , s j ) to any s j ∈ S j . A mixed strategy x i ∈ ∆ (S i ) can be viewed as an act x S j on S j that assigns z(x i , s j ) to any s j ∈ S j . Hence, 2 Brandenburger (1998) and Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) have shown that a complete state space may not exist if beliefs are not based on subjective probabilities. In contrast to Brandenburger and Keisler's (2002) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) epistemic foundations for IEWDS and EFR respectively, a complete state space is not needed for the present analysis.
3 If conditional completeness is strengthened to completeness, then it follows from Blume et al. (1991a) 
is non-empty and supports any maximal mixed strategy.
The event that i is rational is defined as
Playing the game
The event that i plays the game G = (S 1 , S 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) is given by
is the event that both players play G.
We allow for the possibility that Ω\[u i ] = ∅ merely to ensure that strategy subsets not eliminated by round 1 in the algorithm of Definition 3.1 correspond to choice sets compatible with full admissible consistency in the epistemic characterization of Section 4.6. This requires that, for each i and for any σ i ∈ Σ i , there exists a belief system and some state (s 1 , s 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ Ω such that C t i i = σ i .
Epistemic operators
As illustrated by the analysis of G 2 in Section 6.2, the interactive epistemology must allow a player type to deem an opponent type impossible even if it is the true type of the opponent. This requires a subjective epistemic operator that does not satisfy the truth axiom. Such subjective operators are usually based on the subjective probability distribution
In the present setting where incomplete preferences entail that no such representation is available, operators can instead be based directly the underlying preferences. For this purpose, say that t i is admissible on β j , where ∅ = β j ⊆ S j × T j , if x t i y whenever x β j weakly dominates y β j , and note that
• with µ t i ∈ ∆(S j × T j ) as a representation, supp µ t i is the unique set of opponent strategy-type pairs on which t i is admissible, while
is the collection of nested sets on which t i is admissible. Since we will be concerned with what types of j that i deems possible, what types of i that the possible types of j deem possible, and so on, the operator used for the interactive epistemology will be based on κ t i j . To state this operator-which will be referred to as 'certain belief'-let, for each player i and each state ω ∈ Ω, t i (ω) denote the projection of ω on T i . It will follow that at ω player i 'certainly believes' the event that his type is t i (ω). As it is unnecessary to specify at ω player i's belief about his own strategy choice, we consider only events E ⊆ Ω satisfying that E = S i × proj S j ×T i ×T j E. For any such event E, let
denote the set of opponent strategy-type pairs that are consistent with ω ∈ E and t i (ω) = t i . If E ⊆ Ω satisfies that E = S i × proj S j ×T i ×T j E, then say that at ω player i certainly believes the event E if ω ∈ K i E where
Hence, at ω player i certainly believes E (where
Full admissible consistency
To characterize the concept of fully permissible sets, consider for each i,
, and x t i (ω) y only if where T t i j := proj T j κ t i j denotes the set of opponent types that t i deems possible, and where
, then t i (ω)'s preferences are determined by admissibility on two particular nested set of opponent strategy-type pairs.
Say that at ω player i is fully admissibly consistent (with the game G and the preferences of his opponent) if ω ∈ A 0 i , where
Refer to A 0 := A 0 1 ∩ A 0 2 as the event of full admissible consistency. We can now characterize the concept of fully permissible sets as sets of maximal strategies in states where there is common certain belief of full admissible consistency.
Proposition 4.1. A non-empty strategy set π i for player i is fully permissible in a finite strategic game G if and only if there exists a belief system with π i = C t i (ω) i
for some ω ∈ CKA 0 .
Are the conditions necessary?
In this section we first show how the event used to characterize fully permissible sets-full admissible consistency-can be interpreted in terms of the requirements of 'caution,' 'full belief of opponent rationality,' and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs.' Furthermore, following a common procedure of the axiomatic method, we verify that these requirements are indeed necessary for the characterization in Proposition 4.1 by investigating the consequences of relaxing one requirement at a time. These exercises contribute to the understanding of fully permissible sets by showing that our concept is related to proper equilibrium as well as permissible and rationalizable strategies in the following manner:
• When allowing extraneous restrictions on beliefs, we open for any strategy that can be played with positive probability in a proper equilibrium, implying that forward induction is no longer promoted in G 1 .
• When weakening 'full belief of opponent rationality' to 'belief of opponent rationality, ' we characterize the concept of permissible strategies independently of whether a requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' is retained.
• When removing 'caution,' we characterize the concept of rationalizable strategies independently of whether extraneous restrictions on beliefs are allowed and full belief of opponent rationality is weakened.
To relax 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' we need a model-as the one introduced in Section 4-that is versatile enough to allow for preferences that are more complete than being determined by admissibility on two nested sets. To state the condition of 'full belief of opponent rationality' we need to introduce 'full belief' as an epistemic operator. Also this operator will be defined on the class of events E ⊆ Ω satisfying that E = S i × proj S j ×T i ×T j E. For any E in this class, say that at ω player i fully believes the event E if ω ∈ B 0 i E where
Interpreting full admissible consistency
, then at ω i fully believes that j is rational. This means that any (s j , t j ) that is deemed possible and where s j is a rational choice by t j is considered infinitely more likely than any (s j , t j ) where s j is not a rational choice by t j .
] is obtained by imposing minimal completeness, which in this context yields the requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs. ' As pointed out in Appendix B, the operator B 0 i does not satisfy monotonicity since E ⊆ F does not imply B 0 i E ⊆ B 0 i F . Such non-monotonic operators arise also in other contributions that provide epistemic conditions for forward induction. In particular, Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) use essentially the same operator, which they refer to as 'assumption, ' and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) use a non-monotonic operator that they call 'strong belief.' However, in contrast to the use of non-monotonic operators in these contributions, our non-monotonic operator B 0 i is used only to interpret 'full admissible consistency,' while the monotonic operator K i is used for the interactive epistemology. The importance of this will be discussed in Section 7. There we also comment on how the present requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' is related to Brandenburger and Keisler's (2002) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) use of a complete epistemic model.
Allowing extraneous restrictions on beliefs
In view of the previous subsection, we allow extraneous restrictions on beliefs by replacing, for each i, Note that (U, R) is a proper equilibrium in the 'Battle-of-the-sexes-with-an-outsideoption' (G 1 ), while neither U nor R is consistent with common certain belief of full admissible consistency. This demonstrates that 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' is necessary for the characterization in Proposition 4.1 of the concept of fully permissible sets, which in G 1 promotes only the forward induction outcome (M, L) (cf. the analysis of G 1 in Sections 3.3 and 6.1).
Weakening full belief of opponent rationality
To weaken 'full belief' to 'belief,' recall that β t i j denotes the smallest non-empty set on which t i is admissible. If E ⊆ Ω satisfies that E = S i × proj S j ×T i ×T j E, then say that at ω player i believes the event E if ω ∈ B i E where
As shown in Appendix B, we have that K i E ⊆ B 0 i E ⊆ B i E. In particular, 'belief' is implied by 'full belief. ' We can now weaken B 
] is obtained by imposing minimal completeness, which in the context of 'belief of opponent rationality' yields a requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs.' To impose 'caution' and 'belief of opponent rationality,' let for each i,
To add 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs,' consider for each i, 5 This result is proven in Appendix C by use of Proposition 5 in Blume et al. (1991b) , which only applies to 2-player games. The result can even so be generalized to n-player games, since the independence of beliefs imposed by proper equilibrium makes the implication easier to fulfill, as long as no independence is introduced in the definition of A 0 . 6 When preferences are complete and thus represented by an LPS, this notion of 'belief' corresponds to 'belief with primary probability 1,' which is the operator used by Brandenburger (1992) .
where A i ⊆ A i . Write A := A 1 ∩ A 2 and A := A 1 ∩ A 2 . Since A ⊆ A, the following proposition implies that the DF procedure is characterized if 'full belief of opponent rationality' is weakened to 'belief of opponent rationality,' independently of whether a requirement of 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' is retained. This shows that 'full belief of opponent rationality' is necessary for the characterization in Proposition 4.1 of the concept of fully permissible sets. 
Removing caution
, the following result means that the removal of 'caution' leads to a characterization of IESDS, independently of whether extraneous restrictions on beliefs are allowed and full belief of opponent rationality is weakened. Thus, 'caution' is necessary for the characterization in Proposition 4.1. 
Investigating examples
The present section illustrates the concept of fully permissible sets by returning to the previously discussed games G 1 and G 2 , as well as by considering one new example. Of the three examples, G 2 will be used to interpret the occurrence of multiple fully permissible sets, while the others will be used to show how our concept captures aspects of forward induction.
All three examples will be used to shed light on the differences between, on the one hand, the approach suggested here and, on the other hand, IEWDS as characterized by Stahl (1995) : A strategy survives IEWDS if and only if it is a best response to a belief where one strategy is infinitely less likely than another if the former is eliminated at an earlier round than the latter. 7
Forward induction
Reconsider G 1 of the introduction, and apply our algorithm IECFA to this 'Battle-ofthe-sexes-with-an-outside-option' game. Since D is a dominated strategy, D cannot be an element of 1's choice set. This does not imply, as in the procedure of IEWDS (given Stahl's, 1995, characterization) , that 2 deems M infinitely more likely than D. However, 2 certainly believes that only {U }, {M}, and {U, M} are candidates for 1's choice set. This excludes {R} as 2's choice set, since {R} is 2's choice set only if 2 deems {D} or {U, D} possible. This in turn means that 1 certainly believes that only {L} and {L, R} are candidates for 2's choice set, implying that {U } cannot be 1's choice set. Certainly believing that only {M} and {U, M} are candidates for 1's choice set does imply that 2 deems M infinitely more likely than D. Hence, 2's choice set is {L} and, therefore, 1's choice set {M}. Thus, the forward induction outcome (M, L) is promoted.
To show how common certain belief of the event A 0 is consistent with the fully permissible sets {M} and {L}-and thus illustrate Proposition 4.1-consider a belief system with only one type of each player; i.e., T 1 × T 2 = {t 1 } × {t 2 }. Let, for each i, 
Turn now to the 'Burning money' game due to van Damme (1989) and Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) . G 5 of Fig. 5 is the pure strategy reduced strategic form of a 'Battleof-the-sexes' (B-o-s) game with the addition that 1 can publicly destroy 1 unit of payoff before the B-o-s game starts. BU (NU ) is the strategy where 1 burns (does not burn), and then plays U , etc., while LR is the strategy where 2 responds with L conditional on 1 not burning and R conditional on 1 burning, etc. The forward induction outcome (supported, e.g., by IEWDS) involves implementation of 1's preferred B-o-s outcome, with no payoff being burnt.
One might be skeptical to the use of IEWDS in the 'Burning money' game, because it effectively requires 2 to infer that BU is infinitely more likely than BD based on the sole Table 1 Applying IECFA to 'Burning money' premise that BD is eliminated before BU , even though all strategies involving burning (i.e., both BU and BD) are eventually eliminated by the procedure. On the basis of this premise such an inference seems at best to be questionable. As shown in Table 1 , the application of our algorithm IECFA yields an iteration where at no stage need 2 deem BU infinitely more likely than BD, since {NU} is always included as a candidate for 1's choice set. The procedure uniquely determines {NU} as 1's fully permissible set and {LL, LR} as 2's fully permissible set. Even though the forward induction outcome is obtained, 2 does not have any assessment concerning the relative likelihood of opponent strategies conditional on burning; hence, she need not interpret burning as a signal that 1 will play according with his preferred B-o-s outcome. 8 We can conclude that the concept of fully permissible sets yields the forward induction outcome in G 1 and G 5 . Furthermore, the concept promotes forward induction for different reasons than does the procedure of IEWDS (and the concept of EFR, which in the extensive form of these games works like IEWDS).
Multiple fully permissible sets
Let us also return to G 2 of the introduction, where IEWDS eliminates D in the first round, R in the second round, and M in the third round, so that U and L survive. Stahl's (1995) characterization of IEWDS entails that 2 deems each of U and M infinitely more likely than D. Hence, the procedure forces 2 to deem M infinitely more likely than D for the sole reason that D is eliminated before M, even though both M and D are eventually eliminated by the procedure.
Applying our algorithm IECFA yields the following result. Since D is a weakly dominated strategy, D cannot be an element of 1's choice set. Hence, 2 certainly believes that only {U }, {M}, and {U, M} are candidates for 1's choice set. This excludes {R} as 2's choice set, since {R} is 2's choice set only if 2 deems {D} or {U, D} possible. This in turn means that 1 certainly believes that only {L} and {L, R} are candidates for 2's choice set, implying that {M} cannot be 1's choice set. There is no further elimination. This means that 1's collection of fully permissible sets is {{U }, {U, M}} and 2's collection of fully permissible sets is {{L}, {L, R}}. Thus, common certain belief of full admissible consistency implies that 2 deems U infinitely more likely than D since U (respectively, D) is an element of any (respectively, no) fully permissible set for 1. However, whether 2 deems M infinitely more likely than D depends on the type of player 2.
To show how common certain belief of the event A 0 is consistent with the collections of fully permissible sets {{U }, {U, M}} and {{L}, {L, R}}-and thus illustrate Proposition 4.1 also in the case of G 2 -consider a belief system with two types of each player; i.e., T 1 × T 2 = {t 1 , t 1 }×{t 2 , t 2 }. Let, for each type t i of any player i, 
Our analysis of G 2 allows a player to deem an opponent choice set to be impossible even when it is the true choice set of the opponent. E.g., at ω = (s, t 1 , t 2 ) with t 1 = t 1 and t 2 = t 2 , player 1 deems it impossible that player 2's choice set is {L, R} even though this is the true choice set of player 2. Likewise, at ω = (s, t 1 , t 2 ) with t 1 = t 1 and t 2 = t 2 , player 2 deems it impossible that player 1's choice set is {U, M} even though this is the true choice set of player 1. This is an unavoidable feature of this game as there exists no pair of non-empty strategy subsets (Q 1 , Q 2 ) such that Q 1 = S 1 \D 1 (Q 2 ) and Q 2 = S 2 \D 2 (Q 1 ). It implies that under full admissible consistency we cannot have in G 2 that each player is certain of the true choice set of the opponent.
Multiplicity of fully permissible sets arises also in the strategic form of certain extensive games in which the application of backward induction is controversial, e.g., the 'Centipede' game. For more on this, see Asheim and Dufwenberg (2001) where the concept of fully permissible sets is used to analyze extensive games.
Related literature
It is instructive to explain how our analysis differs from the epistemic foundations of IEWDS and EFR provided by Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) (BK) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) (BS), respectively. It is of minor importance for the comparison that EFR makes use of the extensive form, while the present analysis is performed in the strategic form. The reason is that, by 'caution,' a rational choice in the whole game implies a rational choice at all information sets that are not precluded from being reached by the player's own strategy.
To capture forward induction players must essentially deem any opponent strategy that is a rational choice infinitely more likely than any opponent strategy not having this property. An analysis incorporating this feature must involve a non-monotonic epistemic operator, which is called 'full belief' in the present analysis (cf. Section 5.1), while the corresponding operators are called 'assumption' and 'strong belief' by BK and BS, respectively.
We use 'full belief' only to define the event that the preferences of each player is 'fully admissibly consistent' with the preferences of his opponent, while the monotonic 'certain belief' operator is used for the interactive epistemology:
• each player certainly believes (in the sense of deeming the complement impossible) that the preferences of his opponent are fully admissibly consistent, • each player certainly believes that his opponent certainly believes that he himself has preferences that are fully admissibly consistent, etc.
As the examples of Section 6 illustrate, it is here a central question what opponent types (choice sets) a player deems possible (i.e., not Savage-null). Consequently, the 'certain belief' operator is appropriate for the interactive epistemology. In contrast, BK and BS use their non-monotonic operators for the interactive epistemology. In the process of defining higher order beliefs both BK and BS impose that lower order beliefs are maintained. This is precisely how BK obtain Stahl's (1995) characterization which-e.g., in G 2 of the introduction-seems to correspond to extraneous and hard-to-justify restrictions on beliefs.
Stahl's characterization provides an interpretation of IEWDS where strategies eliminated in the first round are completely irrational, while strategies eliminated in later rounds are at intermediate degrees of rationality. Likewise, Battigalli (1996) has shown how EFR corresponds to the 'best rationalization principle,' entailing that some opponent strategies are neither completely rational nor completely irrational. The present analysis, in contrast, differentiates only between whether a strategy is maximal (i.e., a rational choice) or not. As the examples of Section 6 illustrate, although a strategy that is weakly dominated on the set of all opponent strategies is a "stupid" choice, it need not be "more stupid" than any remaining admissible strategy, as this depends on the interactive analysis of the game.
The fact that a non-monotonic epistemic operator is involved when capturing forward induction also means that the analysis must ensure that all rational choices for the opponent are included in the epistemic model. BK and BS ensure this by employing complete epistemic models, where all possible epistemic types for each player are represented. Instead, the present analysis achieves this by requiring 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs,' meaning that the preferences are minimally complete (cf. Section 5.1). Since an ordinary monotonic operator is used for the interactive epistemology, there is no more need for a complete epistemic model here than in usual epistemic analyses of rationalizability and permissibility.
Our paper has a predecessor in Samuelson (1992) , who also presents an epistemic analysis of admissibility that leads to a collection of sets for each player, called a 'generalized consistent pair.' Samuelson requires that a player's choice set equals the set of strategies that are not weakly dominated on the union of choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent; this implies our requirements of 'full belief of opponent rationality' and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' (cf. Samuelson, 1992, p. 311) . However, he does not require that each player deems no opponent strategy impossible, as implied by our requirement of 'caution.' Hence, his analysis does not yield {{U, M}} × {{L}} in G 3 of Section 2. Furthermore, he defines possibility relative to a knowledge operator that satisfies the truth axiom, while our analysis-as illustrated by the discussion of G 2 in Section 6.2-allows a player to deem an opponent choice set to be impossible (or more precisely, Savage-null) even when it is the true choice set of the opponent. This explains why we in contrast to Samuelson obtain general existence (cf. Proposition 3.1(i)).
If each player is certain of the true choice set of the opponent, one obtains a 'consistent pair' (cf. Börgers and Samuelson, 1992) , a concept that need not exist even when a generalized consistent pair exists. Ewerhart (1998) modifies the concept of a consistent pair by adding 'caution.' However, since he allows extraneous restrictions on beliefs to ensure general existence, his concept of a 'modified consistent pair' does not promote forward induction in G 1 . Basu and Weibull's (1991) 'tight curb* set' is another variant of a consistent pair that ensures existence without yielding forward induction in G 1 , as they impose 'caution' but weaken 'full belief of opponent rationality' to 'belief of opponent rationality.' In particular, the set of permissible strategy vectors is tight curb*.
'Caution' and 'full belief of opponent rationality' are admissibility requirements on the preferences (or beliefs) of players. Moreover, by imposing 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs' as a requirement of minimal completeness, preferences are not in general representable by subjective probabilities. By not employing subjective probabilities, the analysis is related to the filter model of belief presented by Brandenburger (1998) . By imposing requirements on the preferences of players rather than their choice, our paper follows a tradition in equilibrium analysis where concepts are characterized as equilibria in conjectures (cf. Blume et al., 1991b) . This approach can also be used to characterize backward induction and to define rationalizability analogs to sequential, quasi-perfect and proper equilibrium (cf. Asheim, 2001 , 2002 , and Asheim and Perea, 2002 .
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It is straightforward to verify that, in general, K i and B i correspond to KD45 systems. However, even though the operator B ({(s 1 , s 2 , t 1 , t 2 ) | s 1 ∈ {U, M}}) does imply that t 2 (ω) prefers L to R. For the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 5.2, we need to establish some properties of iterated mutual certain belief. With KE = K 1 E ∩ K 2 E as the mutual certain belief operator defined on {E ⊆ Ω | E = S i × S j × proj T i ×T j E}, write K 0 E := E and, for each g 1, K g E := KK g−1 E. Since K i (E ∩ F ) = K i E ∩ K i F , and since K i ∅ = ∅, conjunction, and positive and negative introspection imply K i K i E = K i E, it follows ∀g 2,
Even though the truth axiom (K i E ⊆ E) is not satisfied, the present paper considers certain belief only of events E ⊆ Ω that can be written as E = E 1 ∩ E 2 where, for each i, E i = S i × S j × proj T i E × T j . Mutual certain belief of any such event E implies that E is true: Definition C.1. Consider the sequence defined by X(0) = S and, ∀g 1, X(g) =ã(X(g − 1)). A pure strategy p i for player i is said to be permissible if p i ∈ ∞ g=0 X i (g).
Let P = P 1 × P 2 denote the set of permissible strategy vectors. To characterize P , write for any (∅ =) X = X 1 × X 2 ⊆ S, a(X) := a 1 (X 2 ) × a 2 (X 1 ), where a i (X j ) := p i ∈ S i ∃(∅ =)Q j ⊆ X j s.t. p i ∈ S i \D i (Q j ) .
Lemma C.1. For any (∅ =) X j ⊆ S j , a i (X j ) =ã i (X j ).
Proof. The proof is available on request from the authors. ✷ Proposition C.1. (i) The sequence defined by X(0) = S and, ∀g 1, X(g) = a(X(g − 1)) converges to P in a finite number of iterations.
(ii) ∀i ∈ I , P i = ∅.
(iii) P = a(P ).
(iv) ∀i ∈ I , p i ∈ P i if and only if there exists X = X 1 × X 2 with p i ∈ X i such that X ⊆ a(X).
